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Recent literature has contained much about the theory of 11 random 
walks 11 in stock market prices. This theory in essence maintains that 
successive price changes in individual stocks are independent of past 
changes in price, at least to the extent that any existing dependence 
cannot be utilized to increase expected profits from stock transactions. 
To date, the independence assumption of the random walk model has been 
tested, primarily, by academicians via standard statistical tools such 
as serial correlation tests, analysis of runs of successive price 
changes of the same sign, and spectral analysis. The results in each 
instance seem to uphold the model. If indeed it does exist, this indi-
cated independence would seem to undermine the very foundation upon 
which the numerous technical theories, abounding in Wall Street, are 
built. 
Generally speaking, the theories of the Wall Street technicians 
seem to suggest that it is best to buy stocks that recently have been 
stronger than the market as a whole and sell stocks that have been 
weaker. Detection of such stocks and general trends is attempted, for 
the most part, by reliance on various charting techniques. However, 
it is often difficult, if not impossible, to establish the specific 
system involved in such approaches due to a lack of information. 
It can be stated with certainty that the technicians are in oppo-
1 
2 
sition to the random walk hypothesis. Yet while their chartist meth-
odology is based on the very dependence assumption which the random 
walk proponents claim to have refuted, they have made no serious attempt 
at empirical validation of their own views. 
Thus, two diametrically opposed groups with widely divergent views 
exist. Although each group attests to the validity of their particular 
viewpoint, little has been done by either faction to test their views 
by direct empirical comparison. This situation is largely due to the 
fact that the random walk school has developed its case in academic 
journals in language couched in terms of mathematical reasoning not 
easily understandable to the Wall Street technician. At the same time, 
the chartists have made no public attempt to rigorously formulate their 
own beliefs. 
Purpose of the Study 
The basic purpose of this study is to provide an empirical test 
of a specific technical trading theory. Concurrently, through direct 
comparison of the results evolving from use of these technical trading 
rules with the results of a naive buy-and-hold policy applied to the 
same stocks, a test will be provided to a limited degree with regard 
to the random nature of stock market prices. 
The results derived from testing one specific technical theory 
will admittedly not provide a conclusive basis for broad generaliza-
tions about chartist techniques in the aggregate. It has been sug-
gested that a systematic validation or invalidation of all the various 
types of chartists theories will in all likelihood be necessary before 
any broad conclusions may be drawn, and the intent of this study is to 
3 
provide a step in that direction,l 
Scope of the Study 
This study basically encompasses three periods: Period One--
July 1, 1965 through June 30, 1966; Period Two--June 16, 1964 through 
June 15, 1965; and Period Three--July 1, 1963 through June 30, 1966. 
These particular periods of time were chosen for the following respec-
tive reasons: 
Period One includes two spans of time which exhibit definite and 
differing trends, i.e., over-all upward price movement and over-all 
downward price movement. This was deemed beneficial for test purposes 
by providing a measure of the ability of the trading technique to cope 
with both types of situations. Also, inclusion of a period exhibiting 
both these characteristics was considered a means of reducing bias in 
the experiment. 
The Period Two starting date was chosen at random from the three-
year period ending June 30, 1966. The period of one year was deemed 
lengthy enough to provide worthwhile inferences in addition to being 
expedient for computing rates of return. 
Period Three was, likewise, considered lengthy enough to provide 
meaningful implications and yet current enough to be truly representa-
tive of the nature of the market as it presently exists. The relative 
brevity of the time periods used was not considered a limitation of 
this study. On the contrary, the sacrifice of lengthiness for the sake 
of currency was deemed advantageous. The stock market is a dynamic 
lEugene F. Fama, 11 The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 11 Journal of 
Business, XXXVIII (January 1965), p. 99, 
system) constantly changing in nature just as the environment in which 
it is encompassed is ever changing. A test that covers a period of 
several preceding months or years would appear to lose validity due to 
the averaging effect of taking into account environmental phenomena 
which are not currently applicable. 
During the above periods) two separate and distinct approaches 
were utilized and the results of each compared. 
4 
One approach is a variation of technical theory as conceived and 
depicted by Mr. E. S. C. Coppock of the Trendex Research Group, San 
Antonio, Texas, a well-known investment advisory service. This approach 
has been labeled by its author as a 11 Timing Technique for Traders. 11 
Basic timing devices employed in this technique are market breadth data 
such as the daily number of stocks advancing and declining, the total 
issues traded, and a weighted thirty-day moving average based on this 
data. Selection criteria are based on recent strength or weakness of 
specific stocks relative to the market as a whole. 
The alternative method utilizes application of a naive buy-and-
hold policy to the same stocks selected for use in the timing tech-
nique. The date of purchase and sale for each of these stocks coin-
cides with the first and last trading dates indicated by the timing 
technique during the above-mentioned periods in order to provide an 
equitable comparative base with regard to rate of return. Comparison 
of buy-and-hold results with those generated through use of the 11 timing 
technique 11 should determine whether the trading rules are an efficient 
means of increasing expected profits from stock transactions. 
Historical background information with regard to both technical 
theory and the theory of random walks is furnished in Chapter II. 
Chapter III provides a measure of the present state of the controversy, 
pointed out heretofore by presenting certain of the more pertinent and 
timely published research works in this area. Methodology with respect 
to each of the specific approaches utilized is described in Chapter IV. 
Contained in Chapter V are all statistical results as illustrated by 
tables giving stocks selected, dates of purchase and sale, quantities 
and amounts purchased and sold, brokerage costs, and net gain or loss 
and rate of return for each stock or group of stocks. Chapter V, also, 
contains the comparative summary and analysis. Chapter VI, the final 
chapter, includes a summarization of conclusions generated by the 






Two groups of conditions are always present in the stock market 
to affect the course of prices. The first of these relates to the 
monetary structure of the market itself and is characterized as 11tech-
nical. 11 The second relates to the adjustment of prices to economic 
conditions and is referred to as 11 fundamental. 112 Individuals basing 
their market strategies on the former condition, as regards both selec-
tion and timing, are known as technicians. For the purposes of this 
paper, the views of the fundamentalist will be circumvented and dis-
cussion confined to technical theory and its evolution. 
Generally speaking, most technicians, or technical traders, may 
be categorized as either "bar chartists," "point-and-figure chartists," 
or 11tape readers, 113 There are many variations of these basic strategies, 
as well as several other strategies which do not specifically require 
the use of charts or tapes. No matter which tool is employed, however, 
its proponents undoubtedly feel that with proper interpretation it will 
provide a guide to either selection or timing, or both. Even though 
2charles A. Dice, David K. Eiteman, and William J. Eiteman, The 
Stock :Market (New York, 1966), p. 403. 
3Ibid., p. 215. 
6 
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there is some divergence among the approaches used by technicians, 
basically all technical strategies are founded upon a common set of 
assumptions. 
The foundation for technical theory was erected around the turn 
of this century by Charles H. Dow, cofounder and editor of the Wall 
Street Journal. In various editorials during the period 1900-1902, 
Dow attempted to demonstrate that beneath the fluctuations in individual 
stocks there was an ever present trend with regard to the market as a 
whole. In order to show the movements of these trends he devised the 
now famous Dow-Jones averages. 
This was the beginning of what later came to be knovm. as the Dow 
Theory. Actually, this theory was in effect a combination of Dow's 
market wisdom with that of William Peter Hamilton, Dow's successor as 
editor of the Wall Street Journal. In addition to his highly regarded 
book, The Stock Market Barometer, published in 1922, Hamilton used 
Dow's observations in his editorials as a basis for ma.king forecasts 
of future stock movements. Although Dow originated the theory and 
Hamilton ma.de practical applications of it, neither attempted to pro-
vide concrete definitions of the Dow Theory, as such. 
Even though the theory has gained fairly wide acceptance, it was 
not until 1932 that a definitive approach was attempted. After ten 
years of successful trading based on the theory and an intensive study 
of both authors' writings, Rhea, in his book, The Dow Theory, extracted 
and presented what he felt were the basic Dow hypotheses.4 
The popularity of technical trading grew rapidly after the pub-
4Robert Rhea, The Dow Theory (Abridged Edition), (New York, 1932), 
pp. 12-15. 
lishing of the Rhea book. Many new specific trading theories were 
evolved, all of which were descendents of the Dow Theory in that they 
were based on the detection of trends. This growth in popularity has 
continued undiminished up to the present day, with the number of varia-
tions applied to the technical theme showing a marked increase in 
recent times due to the advent of computerized techniques. The number 
of investment advisory services and mutual funds has increased enormously 
in the past decade, and many of them rely to some extent on technical 
analysis, particularly for timing. 
According to the Dow Theory, the market at any given moment is the 
composite resultant of three movements: (1) a major trend up or down; 
(2) an intermediate movement toward or away from this trend; and (3) 
more or less patternless day-to-day fluctuations.5 
A major movement of the market is one that lasts from approximately 
nine months to two years and may be either an upward or a downward 
trend. It is primarily with reference to the major movements that the 
Dow Theory makes any positive claims. It may or may not be effective 
in predicting the secondary moves. The primary usage is for interpre-
tation of the averages for indications as to whether an upward or down-
ward turn in prices has occurred or is imminent. 
After every primary movement has gone on for some time, a secondary 
movement will appear and for a short time, perhaps a week to two months, 
will carry an upward moving market down or a downward moving market up. 
These actions and reactions are deemed a regular part of the market 
program and may be expected to produce countermoves of almost half the 
5Dice, p. 349, 
9 
previous rise or decline of the market. 
Current fluctuations arise from the fact that the market is a 
dynamic system, with rapid, but temporary, changes ever present. The 
averages indicate these changes from day to day, but they cannot be 
predicted, nor can they be used to predict anything fundamental in 
business. 
The Dow Theory holds that the stock market is a barometer of busi-
ness. The original purpose of the theory was not to predict movements 
of secutity prices for traders but rather to forecast business cycles 
or·the larger movements of depression and prosperity. In reality, 
the Dow Theory is simply a crude tool with the practical purpose of 
indicating the relative strength of supply and demand of stocks con-
verging upon the market. 
A trend may be defined as 11an inclination in a particular direc-
tion, 11 and the very core of the Dow Theory maintains that the past 
trend in stock prices reveals this future inclination. This proposition 
was almost unanimously accepted as fact until recently when a contra-
dictory school of thought began to gather followers. 
The Random Walk Theory 
Ironically, the first complete development of a theory of random 
walks in security prices is due to Bachelier, whose original work 
appeared, as did Dow's, around the turn of the century. Unfortunately, 
his work failed to receive attention from economists, and in fact was 
independently derived by Osborne over fifty years later. 6 In contrast 
6Milton F. M. Osborne, "Brownian Motion in the Stock Market," 
Operations Research, VII, No. 2 (March-April, 1959), pp. 145-173, 
10 
to technical theory, the theory of random walks says the future path of 
the price level of a security is no more predictable than the path of 
a series of cumulated random numbers. In statistical terms, the theory 
says that successive price changes are independent, identically dis-
tributed random variables.? This implies, of course, that the series 
of price changes has no memory; that is, the past cannot be used to 
predict the future in any meaningful way. 
The bulk of recent work in support of the random walk theory has 
been carried out by the Graduate School of Business of the University 
of Chicago. This research has been in conjunction with the Center for 
Research in Security Prices at the school and has been published peri-
odically in the Journal of Business. Through numerous tests of the 
random walk model's empirical validity, a voluminous amount of empirical 
evidence in support of the model has been accumulated. 
The theory of random walks in stock prices actually involves two 
separate hypotheses: (1) successive price changes are independent, 
and (2) the price changes conform to some probability distribution.8 
It is the first of these two hypotheses that so directly conflicts with 
the beliefs of the technicians. The random walk theory of independence 
is admittedly not a completely accurate description of the real world 
since perfect independence is not likely to be found. However, for the 
stock market trader the independence assumption is an adequate descrip-
tion of reality so long as the actual degree of dependence cannot be 
used to increase expected gains. 
7Fama, p. 34, 
8Ibid., p. 35. 
11 
Stated another way, the theory of random walks makes the assumption 
that the stock exchange is not only well organized and highly competi-
tive, but is a perfect market. Taken in the aggregate, the prices 
established in the marketplace thoroughly reflect the best evaluation 
of currently available knowledge, even though, individually, buyers or 
sellers may act with far less than perfect knowledge. If any substan-
tial group of buyers felt prices were too low, their buying would force 
prices up, and the reverse would be true if prices were deemed too 
high. Except for appreciation due to earnings retention, the conditional 
expectation of tomorrow's price, given today's price, is today's price. 
As stated by Cootner: 
In such a world, the only price changes that 
would occur are those which result from new informa-
tion. Since there is no reason to expect that in-
formation to be nonrandom in its appearance, the 
period-to-period price changes of a stock should be 
random movements, statistically independent of one 
another. The level of stock prices will, under these 
conditions, describe what statisticians call a random 
walk, the physicists call Brownian motion. In the 
normal course of events, the level of prices, i.e., 
the summation of these random movements, will show 
movements that look like cycles but in fact are not. 
Nothing can be learned about the future from looking 
at these price series. Buying a stock based on 
signals from such a chart will produce results no 
better than those from repeated flipping of a fair 
coin.9 
Random walk proponents, of course, do not claim that the stock 
exchange represents the "perfect" market no more than they claim per-
feet independence in stock prices. Practically speaking, their asser-
tion is that the investor should accept the theory of random walks as 
9Paul H. Cootner, 11Stock Prices: Random vs. Systematic Changes," 
Industrial Management Review, III, No. 2 (Spring, 1962), p. 25. 
12 
the better model if the actual degree of dependence in successive price 
changes cannot be used to produce greater expected profits than those 
derived from use of a naive buy-and-hold policy. 
CHAPTER III 
STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY - PERTINENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
Alexandrian Filter Rules 
The complete lack of direct empirical testing of technical trading 
methods and the reasons for this shortcoming have been discussed in 
Chapter I. In order to better clarify the present state of the contro-
versy at hand, however, brief mention should be made of certain of the 
more important recent findings contained in published empirical tests 
of independence. 
Not all these published tests have employed standard statistical 
models. A notable exception is the work of Sidney S. Alexander. 10 
Professor Alexander devised a mechanical trading rule which attempted 
to apply more sophisticated criteria to identify movements in stock 
prices through the use of what he terms as 11 filters. 11 An 11x 11 percent 
filter is defined as follows: If the daily closing price of a partic-
ular security moves up at least 11x 11 percent, buy and hold the security 
until its price moves down at least 11x 11 percent from a subsequent 
high, at which time simultaneously sell the amount on hand and sell 
11 short 11 an equal amount. The short position is maintained until the 
daily closing price rises at least 11x 11 percent above a subsequent low 
lOsidney S. Alexander, 11Price Movements in Speculative Markets: 
Trends or Random Walks, 11 Industrial Management Review, II, No. 2 (May, 
1961), pp. 7-26. 
13 
14 
at which time one covers the amount sold 11 short 11 and buys an equivalent 
amount 11long. 11 Moves of less than 11x 11 percent in either direction are 
ignored. 
Alexander tested his technique for filters ranging in size from 
five to fifty percent. The tests covered different time periods from 
1897 to 1959 and involved closing prices for two indexes: Dow-Jones 
Industrial Averages from 1897 to 1929 and Standard and Poor's Composite 
Averages from 1929 to 1959, In general, filters of all different si~zes 
and for different periods of time yielded substantial profits, signifi-
cantly greater than a buy-and-hold policy. This led Alexander to con-
clude that the independence assumption was not upheld. 11 
Several shortcomings were later pointed out with regard to 
Alexander's test, however. :Mandelbrot pointed out biases leading to 
overstatement of profits, i.e., buying at prices exactly equal to the 
low plus 11x 11 percent and selling at the high minus 11x 11 percent was 
deemed unrealistic due to the frequency of large price fluctuations. 12 
In a later article, Alexander took account of discontinuities in the 
price series, drastically reducing his profit.13 
This study was not the end of the criticism of the filter rules 
test. In a subsequent article, Fama and Blume made further allowances 
for the effect of dividends accruing to the buy-and-hold approach which 
resulted in an even less favorable comparison for the Alexandrian filter 
11 Ibid. , p. 26 . 
12Benoit :Mandelbrot, 11 The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices," 
The Journal of Business, XXXVI, No. 4 (October, 1963), pp. 384-419. 
13sidney S. Alexander, "Price Movements in Speculative :Markets: 
Trends or Random Walks - No. 2, 11 Industrial :Management Review, II, 
No. 2 (Spring, 1964), pp. 25-46. 
15 
rules. 14 At the same time brokerage commissions arising from the fre-
quent transactions initiated by the mechanical trading rules were shown 
to produce disastrous effects. 
THis latter test showed that although on the small filters of 
one-half to one-and-one-half percent there was evidence of persistence 
or positive dependence in very small movements of stock prices, unless 
one did not have to pay the usual brokerage fees, the technique was not 
profitable. Even then, due to out-of-pocket transaction costs, the 
buy-and-hold policy was not outperformed by any significant margin. 
All filters below twelve percent and above twenty-five percent 
were found to produce negative average returns per security after 
commissions. Filters between twelve and twenty-five percent produced 
positive returns, ranging from roughly one and one-half percent for 
the fourteen percent filter to three percent via the twenty percent 
filter. These returns were scant when compared to the average return 
of just under ten percent produced by the buy-and-hold policy during 
the test period. As a result, the authors concluded that even though 
standard statistical tools such as serial correlation cannot provide 
exact estimates of the expected profits from mechanical trading rules, 
they can measure direction and degree of dependence in price changes 
as well, at least, as the Alexandrian filter rules. 15 
Levy 1s Simulation Mqdels 
While the technicians of Wall Street have failed to respond seri-
lL+Eugene F. Fama and Marshall E. Blume, "Filter Rules and Stock 
Market Trading," Journal of Business, XXXIX, No. 1, Part II (January, 
1966), pp. 226-241. 
15Ibid., pp. 239-241. 
16 
ously to the issues raised by the academicians, they have recently 
received support from a scholarly source. In his doctoral dissertation 
at .American University in Washington, D.C., Levy has developed and 
tested "simulation models" of various portfolio-management strategies 
by computer. Of special significance is the fact that Levy's basic 
findings uphold the concept of "relative strength continuation," i.e., 
stocks strong in the recent past are better than stocks weak in the 
recent past. 16 Examining the weekly closing prices of two-hundred 
New York Stock Exchange stocks during the two-hundred-sixty weeks 
between October, 1960 and October, 1965, Levy found that st0cks 
strong during previous twenty-six-week periods do far better than other 
stocks in the subsequent twenty-six-week period. Furthermore, there 
appeared to be a close relationship between the degrees of past and 
future strength over such periods. 
The results of the twenty-six-week studies suggested that the 
optimal investment strategy is one of continuously upgrading a 
portfolio by selling the weakest stocks and using the proceeds to buy 
more of the strongest. Levy experimented with several formulas designed 
to accomplish this. One formula, suitable for an investor willing to 
accept high risks in order to maximize profits, called for buying all 
stocks that in the latest twenty-six-week period has been (a) in the 
top five percent as to market gain and (b) in the top twelve and one-
half percent as to price volatility. After the initial investment, no 
purchases were made unless funds became available because of sales. 
16Robert A. Levy, 11An Evaluation of Selected Applications of Stock 
Market Timing Techniques, Trading Tactics, and Trend Analysis" (unpub. 
Ph.D. dissertation, .American University, 1966), p. 346, 
17 
The stocks were sold whenever their strength deteriorated to a point at 
which they were among the lowest 30 percent of the two-hundred stock 
group as to market gain over the latest twenty-six-week period. Any 
such continuous operation, taking place in the period examined, would 
have yielded an average annual return, after commissions, of 29 percent. 
Stocks bought at random and held throughout this period would have 
gained 10 6/10 percent annually. 17 
Major conclusions developed in the Levy study were as follows: 
First, several applications of technical stock analysis are useful in 
forecasting future price movements. Second, stock prices do follow 
predictable trends and patterns--thus denying the validity of the theory 
of random walks. Third, there is conceptual as well as empirical 
evidence that technical~analysis is a desirable supplement to funda-
mental analysis. Fourth, computer capabilities are invaluable in 
evaluation of technical principles of portfolio management. The fifth, 
and final, major conclusion was that simulation models may be devised 
which are both academically reliable and mathematically uncomplex. 1g 
The findings of Levy are of considerable interest inasmuch as he 
is the first academic student of the stock market to apply sophisticated 
statistical methods to examinations of price fluctuations and arrive at 
conclusions which generally support the basic views of the Wall Street 
technicians and refute the postulates of the random walk theorists. 
The Cootner Model 
A third study of interest was performed by Cootner who used statis-
17rbid., PP· 2s6-2s7. 
lSrbid., pp. 354-355, 
18 
tical methods such as autocorrelation and mean-square successive dif-
ference tests as well as transition matrices to develop a model of 
stock market behavior. 19 The hypothesis which he presented substantially 
differed from the random walk hypothesis, also. 
The model presented by Cootner began with the perfect market con-
cept held by random walk theorists but suggested that this perfection 
was achieved without a high degree of sophistication on the part of 
participants. Due to their being engaged in other occupations, it was 
assumed that opportunity costs per relevant unit of information were 
very h±gh. As a result, prices are accepted by participants as repre-
sentative of true differences in value. Choice of stocks is based 
largely on attitude toward risk. Demand for stocks is primarily depend-
ent upon income level and its distribution. The stockholders in this 
model will be confronted with various surprises as time passes, but the 
majority of the surprises arising this week will not be systematically 
relat~d to surprises appearing next week. 20 
Cootner 1s model also takes into account the professional investors 
or stock market specialists. Their profits were hypothesized to generate 
from observing the random walk of the stock market prices produced by 
nonprofessionals until the price deviates far enough from the expected 
price to warrant prospects of an adequate return. For simplicity, if 
one assumes that every professional has the same expectations and oppor-
tunity costs, then prices will behave as a random walk with reflecting 
barriers. Prices within these upper and lower limits will tend to move 
19 7 Cootner, p. 2. 
2orbid., p. 26. 
19 
like a random walk. Furthermore, there will probably also be random 
changes in the trends around which the random walk takes place since 
changes in the price expectations of professionals will likely occur 
in a random manner. 21 There is much random behavior in the price series 
defined by Cootner, but while it has some implications which are quite 
similar to a random walk, the differences are significant. 
Prediction of Advances.and Declines 
Of particular significance for purposes of this study are two 
articles which appeared in the July 1965 edition of the Journal of 
Business. The first article, by Theil and Leenders, utilized informa-
tion theory to test for dependence on time series data for the propor-
tion of total securities advancing, declining and remaining unchanged 
each day on the Amsterdam Stock Ex:change. 
The Dutch authors hoped to establish the predictability of the 
percentage of advances, declines and those stock prices remaining 
unchanged for the next trading day, given the time series of such frac-
tions up to and including today. Working with the 1,007 trading days 
between November 2, 1959 and October 31, 1963, the authors were able 
to conclude that the Amsterdam Ex:change has a memory of one day as 
regards the fraction of stocks advancing, declining and remaining 
unchanged in price. 22 They found that the best prediction for tomorrow 
was half way between the long-run averages of forty, forty and twenty 
percent, respectively, and the observed fractions of today. 
21rbid., p. 27. 
22H. Theil and C. T. Leenders, "Tomorrow on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange," Journal of Business, XXXVIII, No. 3 (July, 1965), pp. 277-284. 
20 
The second article, by Fama., ma.de reference to the Amsterdam study 
and applied the same approach to New York Stock Exchange data. Also, 
the results derived from use of the information theory approach were 
confirmed by regression analysis. Although there appeared to be some 
dependence in successive values of the proportion of securities ad~: .. 
vancing, declining and unchanged on the New York Stock Exchange, the 
degree of dependence was not strong. As a result, Fama stated: 
Thus it seems safe to conclude that the proportion 
of securities advancing, declining today on the New 
York Stock Exchange do not provide much help in 
predictin~ the proportions advancing and declining 
tomorrow. 3 
Fama's conclusion is especially pertinent to the study at hand 
since, as will be .shown in Chapter IV, the trading technique to be 
tested is based almost exclusively upon manipulation of the daily 
advance, decline and unchanged data eminating from the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
It is not contended that the above-mentioned research efforts are 
exhaustive of those published; however, they seem truly representative 
of those most pertinent. As well as reflecting the differing approaches 
taken, they also point up the fact that the conflict is far from being 
resolved at this particular point in time. 
The two types of approaches which have been utilized are: (1) 
purely statistical tests, and (2) direct tests of mechanical trading 
rules to see whether or not they provide profits greater than buy and 
hold. Since there has been little effort on the part of academic people 
to apply the latter approach to the various chartist theories, one of 
23Eugene F. Fama, "Tomorrow on the New York Stock Exchange," Journal 
of Business, XXXVIII, No. 3 (July, 1965), p. 299, 
the more prolific researchers and authors in this area has suggested 
that systematic validation or invalidation of these theories would 
represent a real contribution. 24 
This suggestion, undoubtedly, points up a fruitful avenue for 
future research since the purely statistical tests have failed to 
either alter the technical traders' beliefs or stimulate them into a 
21 
rigorous public formulation of their own views. The primary barrier to 
implementing such a systematic process is the aforementioned reluctance 
of the chartists to divulge their specific methodologies. The process 
of validating or invalidating becomes fairly straightforward once this 
barrier is passed, as the succeeding chapters will attempt to demonstrate. 
24Fama, 11 The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 11 p. 98. 
CHAPTER IV 
A MECHANICAL TRADING TECHNIQUE VERSUS A RANDOM APPROACH 
A Timing Technique for Traders 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the mechanical trading rules to be tested 
in this study were evolved by Coppock, founder of the Trendex Research 
Group. This group was formed in the mid-forties based upon several 
econometric techniques created by its founder during some fifteen years 
of market operations. His weekly Stock :Market Trendex, originally 
circulated to subscribers in the investment business only, now goes to 
both professionals and amateurs in several countries. Of interest is 
the fact that the 11 Trendex11 primarily utilizes the principle of "rela-
tive strength continuation, 11 vindicated in the Levy study. 
The specific technique of interest for purposes of this report was 
devised by its author as a means of exposing short-term highs and lows 
in stock market trends. Published in typewritten form in June 1966, 
it was furnished, free of charge, to all regular 11 Trendex11 subscribers. 
The method was reputedly designed for the trader desiring to take advan-
tage of trends persisting for more than a very few weeks. Due to the 
high costs of trading, price movements of sufficient duration were 
sought which would make the potential reward more than offset the risks 
involved. 
Since raw data representing a great mass of stocks was deemed 
necessary, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was irrnnediately eliminated 
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as a potential price index. The Standard and Poor 1s five-hundred stock 
index was also discarded since it is not available in all communities. 
The process of elimination brought the choice of an index down to 
market breadth data. It was felt that such data was truly representa-
tive because it covers the direction of price change for evf:}ry stock 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Also, its availability on both 
a daily and weekly basis supported its choice as a basic price index. 
Further decided was that although simple moving averages may be 
helpful in trend analysis their timing is often late and they may pro-
duce false signals which cause frequent trades without gain. Elimina-
tion of false signals is obviously not possible without losing sensi-
tivity in the index or timing guide. A compromise method was therefore 
deemed necessary which gives fairly sensitive trend change signals 
while reducing the number of invalid signals. One such method is use 
of a weighted moving average. There are various ways of computing 
weighted moving averages; however, some that produce superior results 
are too complex for use by a trader not having access to an electronic 
computer. The simplest system for weighting a moving average gives 
maximum weight to the most recent figure, less to yesterday's figure, 
still less to the figure for the day before, etc. This very simple 
weighting plan makes current and recent price action exert a relatively 
strong influence on the level of the moving average data, and in that 
way assumed a more timely pattern. Concurrently, it was felt to provide 
the mathematical simplification necessary for the average trader in 
stocks. 
The time span to be used in a weighted moving average should rely 
on a timing technique which functions for market trends that persist 
long enough to permit worthwhile movements by active stocks. Since 
observation reveals that many short-term market movements persist for 
six to fifteen weeks, and six weeks cover thirty market days, the 
shortest acceptable time span would appear to be thirty market days. 
Based upon the above-mentioned restrictions, criteria decided 
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upon were as follows: (1) the technique should not be very sensitive 
to insignificant market fluctuations; (2) basic data should reflect 
the price trend direction of most listed stocks rather than a small 
number of high-grade stocks; (3) basic daily data should be taken from 
breadth-of-market reports and include the number of issues traded, the 
the number of advances and the number of declines; (4) a weighted 
moving average should be used instead of a simple moving average; and 
( 5) the time span for the weighted moving average should be thirty 
market days. 
An example of manipulation of the data in the form of a 11 data 
sheet 11 may be seen in Table I. Column headings on this sheet are self-
explanatory; however, the reasoning behind certain of the manipulations 
is not so readily apparent. 
For instance, the reason for dividing the net advances or declines 
by the number of issues traded is to discover the percentage of issues 
traded which advanced or declined, and, thus, to take into account the 
number of unchanged prices. The signal to 11buy11 or 11 sell 11 occurs when 
there is a penetration of the weighted moving average by the refined 
daily datum. An example of each type of signal may be seen on April 
4 and February 11, respectively, by reference to Table I. 
At the time of an upward penetration, Coppock recommends buying 
three stocks that have recently been clearly stronger than the general 
. . . 
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market. A downward penetration is a signal to sell those three stocks 
and to make short sales of three different stocks that have been clear-
ly weaker than the general market. He emphasizes that these purchases 
and sales should be made with stocks stronger and weaker than the mar-
ket and not those considered as either a bargain or overpriced. It is 
also recommended that these three stocks be chosen from three different 
industries for purposes of diversification. 
To illustrate the efficacy of this technique with regard to timing, 
11buy 11 and 11 sell 11 signals have been applied to Standard and Poor's 500-
stock index for the period January 1, 1965 through June 15, 1966, and 
are graphically portrayed in Figure 1. Although this portrayal indi-
cates that the technique places the trader on the 11right 11 side of the 
market in most instances, the net profitability of the method in com-
parison with a simple policy of buying and holding is, of course, yet 
to be demonstrated. 
Selection Methodology 
For the test of specific stocks, twelve separate stocks listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange were chosen. Six of these common stocks 
were clearly stronger than the aggregate market for the entire duration 
of the test period and the preceding six months, or more, as well, and 
thus met the previously mentioned selection prerequisites established 
by Coppock. By the same token, the other six stocks were noticeably 
weaker than the market as a whole during the same period. The obvious 
reason for selection of stocks listed on the New York Exchange only is 
that the signal-producing data being used originated from this exchange 
and can only be considered representative of stocks listed thereupon. 
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Figure l. Application of "Timing Technique11 Buy (f) and Sell (+) Signals to Standard and Poor's 500-
Stock Index for Period January 1, 1965 - June 15, 1966. N 
--J 
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The basis for determination of the relative strength of the chosen 
stocks was provided by the April, 1966 edition of 11 Cycli-Graphs, 11 a 
quarterly publication of the Securities Research Company of Boston, 
Massachusetts. 25 The particular trend indicator used was the monthly 
11ratio-cator 11 curve appearing on the individual 11 cycli-graphs. 11 This 
curve is based on the monthly closing price of each stock and its 
percentage relationship to the monthly closing price of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. The choice of this basis for relative strength 
determination was made at the suggestion of the author of the timing 
technique under study. 
The six stocks selected by the above method as being notably 
stronger than the market were: Delta Airlines, Magnavox, McGraw-Hill, 
National Airlines, Polaroid, and Texas Instruments. The stocks chosen 
for weakness in price were: C.I.T. Financial Corporation, First Nation-
al Stores, National Gypsum, Procter and Gamble, South Puerto Rico Sugar, 
and United States Gypsum. Confirmation that each of these stocks fairly 
met the selection criteria may be seen by reference to Figures 2, 3 
and 4 which contain reproductions of the twelve pertinent 11 cycli-graphs. 11 
Each graph contains four different trend lines which depict the monthly 
price range, cumulated twelve month's earnings, and the annual dividend 
rate, in addition to the 11ratio-cator 11 curve. Each trend line is indi-
vidually labeled for purposes of clarification on the U.S. Gypsum 
graph which may be seen in Figure 2. It should be noted that these 
graphs have been arranged according to dictates of size, rather than 
alphabetically or by test. 
25Three-Trend Cycli-Graphs, Securities Research Company, (April 










































Specimen "Cycli-graphs" Used in Tests 1 and 2 •. (Reproduced from 
the April, 1966 edition of Three-Tren.d -Cy:cli..:.Graphs. published 
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Specimen "Cycli-graphs''Used in Tests 1 and 2. (Reproduced from 
· .the April, 1966 edition of Three-Trend Cycli.;.Graphs publiehed 






Specimen "Cycli-graphs" Used in Tests 1.and 2, (Reproduced from 
the April; 1966 edition of Three-Trend Cycli-Graphs published 


























As mentioned earlier, a supplemental test of the timing technique 
was also made with regard to Standard and Poor's five-hundred stock 
composite average. Selection criteria were not needed for this test, 
of course. The applicable purchase or sale price used was simply the 
closing price on the day subsequent to a buy or sell signal. 
The Alternate Technique 
The frame of reference utilized to provide a comparative basis 
for judging the efficacy of the timing strategy may be referred to as 
32 
a naive buy-and-hold policy. This policy was applied to the same 
stocks used for application of the mechanical trading rules. It should 
be intuitively apparent that in order for the technical trading method 
to refute the independence assumptions of the random-walk model it 
should provide greater profits after allowances for broker fees than 
those garnered by simply buying and holding. In order to provide an 
equitable comparative base and to eliminate bias resulting from the use 
of differing time spans, the first and last trading dates for each 
approach have been made to coincide. 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED GROUPS 
The statistical findings smmnarized in this chapter result from 
the three separate examinations conducted as a part of this study. 
These tests represent what is, hopefully, an unbiased effort aimed at 
validation, or invalidation, of the effectiveness of previously de-
scribed trading rules. In accordance with similar investigations con-
ducted in this area, results emanating from application of this mechan-
ical trading process have been directly compared to those yielded by a 
straightforward buy-and-hold (or sell-and-hold) policy. 
The basic assumption inherent in this study is that the timing 
strategy, if found to issue profits greater than buy-and-hold, will 
provide a step toward refutation of the theory of random walks. On the 
other hand, superior buy-and-hold results should provide an indication 
that the random-walk model more accurately describes the movement of 
stock prices than does breadth of market data manipulated in the manner 
prescribed by the specific trading technique in question. 
All test findings in this chapter have been adjusted to include 
deductions for brokerage comrrd.ssions at a rate of 1 percent per trans-
action, either purchase or sale. This rate is consistent with that 
used in tests of a similar nature published elsewhere and closely ap-




The three separate tests conducted are depicted in Table II, 
Table III, and Table IV. All three tables include the dates of purchase. 
and sale for stocks bought long and the dates of sale and covering 
purchase for stocks sold short. Each individual stock used in the first 
two tests is shown in a separate column denoting the pertinent opening 
price for the dates dictated by the mechanical trading rules. Each 
column is summarized for both the "timing technique" and the buy-and-
hold technique with regard to gross profit or loss, brokerage fees, and 
net profit or loss. 
Table II contains the data yielded by Test 1 covering the period 
July 1, 1965 through June 30, 1966. Table III represents the Test 2 
results for the period June 16, 1964 through June 15, 1965. Test 3 is 
depicted in Table IV and illustrates the application of both approaches 
to Standard and Poor's Composite 500-Stock Index for the period July 1, 
1963 through June 30, 1966. The selection basis for each time period 
has previously been discussed in Chapter I, and selection criteria for 
stocks tested was explained in Chapter IV. 
Statistical Results 
In all tests the net profit accruing to all stocks, both individu-
ally and in the aggregate, proved greater through use of the simple 
buy-and-hold approach than through use of the trading rules in question. 
The "timing technique" on all buy long transactions combined yielded 
thirty-three net gains in seventy-one transactions, and on all short 
sales a combined total of sixteen net gains were produced in sixty-
seven transactions. The breakdown by test was as follows on a subse-
quent page. 
TABLE II 
TEST l - COPPOCK 1 S TIMING TECHNIC'UE APPLIED 
DATE Three Stocks Consistently Stronger Than The Market 
BUY SELL 
7 I 9/65 7/19/65 
7 /30/65 9/29/65 
10/5 /65 11/ 9/65 
11/15/65 ll/19/65 
11/29/65 12/ 7/65 
12/13/65 12/27/65 
1/ 4/66 2/ 1/66 
2/10/66 2/16/66 




Net Profit (Loss) 
BUYwAND-BOLD Net Profit 
SELL COVER 
7/19/65 7/30/65 
9/29/65 10/ 5/65 
11/ 9/65 11/15/65 
11/19/65 11/29/65 
12/ 7/65 12/13/65 
12/27/65 1/ 4/66 
2/ 1/66 2/10/66 




Net Profit (Loss) 
SELL-A}lD-HOLD Net Profit 
MAGNAVOX DELTA __EQLAROID 
$ 41.00 $ 41.13 $ 86.oo $ 88.50 $ 65.38 $ 67.13 
41.50 64.87 82.50 106.50 69.87 90.75 
64.75 71.87 104.00 124.25 89.87 102.75 
82.25 78.63 127.00 129.50 106.87 113. 7!; 
~3.75 :,~.oo 13$.:75 136.87 116.25 115.2!; 
81.50 76.63 115.00 JJ.:.6.50 117.25 115.75 
80.87 92.38 140.00 158.25 114.50 125.25 
100.00 98.oo 184.00 179,50 132.87 132.3A 
118.00 116.13 212.50 219.75 150.38 145.50 
107.25 100.25 235.50 218.00 143.00 lhl.50 
$ 17,02 l3 55.37 $ 43.77 
... 16.19 -29.60 -27.56 
$ o.!13 ~ 25.77 $ 21.21 = = 
$ ~7.34 ~12R,96 $ 74.06 
Three Stocks Consistently Weaker Than The Market 
U,S, 3YPSUM C.I.T. FINANCF. PROCTER & GAMBLE 
$ 15.oo s 10.50 $ 32.38 $ 31.75 $ 73.13 $ 73.75 
66.13 66.50 31.25 31.63 72.00 71.38 
65.87 66.13 31.50 31.13. 70.25 70.38 
tJ.00 65.25 31.87 31.75 11.00 70.75 
3.75 64.00 31.25 JO.OD 10.75 70.38 
63.50 65.63 J0.25 31.00 69.00 69.00 
64,38 64.25 30.25 30.75 68.63 66.A7 
63.87 57.63 30.75 27.50 66.87 66.00 
57.00 55.50 27 ,13 29.00 61.50 65.63 
$ 7.11 $ 2.12 $ (1.01) 
-11.58 -5.52 -12.47 
$ ( t.47) ~ (3,[iO) sc13.LA) 








9/ 2/64 10/15/64 
10/19/64 10/28/64 
11/12/64 11/27/64 
1/ 6/65 2/11/65 
2/15/65 3/~8/65 
4/ 9/65 5/17/65 
Gross Profit(Loss) 
Less Commission · 



























































SELL COVER NATIONAL GYPSUM FIBST NATIONAL STORES SO. Pl'ERTCI RICfl SlTGAR -
8/ 5/64 9/2/64 $ 45.13 $ 44.75 $ 51.00 $ 48.00 $ 31.50 $ 34.50 
10/15/64 10/19/64 43.62 44.25 48.25 48.12 32.25 32.25 
10/28/64 11/12/64 43.38 42.13 47.62 47.00 31.50 31.13 
11/27/64 1/ 6/65 41.37 42.00 49.13 47.75 29.:25 32.12 
2/11/65 2/15/65 42.25 41.88 50.00 48.63 31.50 31.12 
3/18/65 4/ 9/65 43.38 41.50 47.75 46.25 29.25 28.75 
5/17/65 6/15/65 40.13 39.75 4'l.fl8 41.38 27.38 22.13 
Gross Profit(Loss) $ 3.00 :It 10.so $ o.63 
Less Commission -5.95 - 6.65 .. )~. 24 
Net Profit (Loss) $ (2.95) $ 3~R5 ~ (3.61) 
SELL-AND-HOLD Net Profit: 
$ 4.53 $ 8.71 $ 8.84 
TABLE IV 
APPLICATION OF THE "TD-UNG TECHNIQUE" TO 
STANDARD AND POOR 1S 500-STOCK INDEX 
JULY l, 1963 - JUNE JO., 1966 
BUY SELL COVER.· GROSS GAIN (LOSS) .. NET GAIN (LOSS} 
DATE OPENING DATE OPENING DATE OPElJING BUY SELL BUY· SELL 
QUOTE QUOTE QUOTE LONG SHORT· WNO SHO'PT 
$/ 7/63 $ 69.96 9/19/63 $ 73.22 1/ 2/64 $ 75.43 $ 3.26 $ (2.21) $ 1.83 $ (J.69) 
1/ 2/64 75.43 1/30/64 76. 70 2/10/64 77.05 1.27 (O,.J5) (0.25) (1.89) . 
2/10/64 77.05 4/23/64 80.38 6/16/64 A0.40 3.33 (0.02) 1.76 (1.62) 
6/16/64 80.40 8/ 5/64 82.09 9/ 2/64 82.31 · 1.69 (0.22) 0.01 · (1.86) 
9/ 2/64 82.Jl 10/15/64 84.25 10/19/64 84.93 1.94 (0.68) 0.28 {2.37) 
J.0/19/64 84.93 10/28/64 84.69 11/12/64 85.19 (0.24) (0.50) (l.94) {2.20) 
ll/12/64 85.19 11/27/64 85.16 1/ 6/65 84.89 . (0.03) 0.27 {l.73) {1.43) 
':!./ 6/65 84.89 2/11/65 85.54 2/15/65 86.07 . o.65 {0.53) {1.05) (2.25) 
2/15/65 86.07 3/18/65 86.81 4/ 9/65 87.56 0.74 {0.75) (0.99) (2.50) 
4/ 9/65 87.56 5/17/65 89.54 7/ 9/65 85.71 1.98 3.83 0.21 2.07 
7/ 9/65 85.71 7/19/65 85.63 7/30/65 85.25 (0.08) 0.38 {1.80) (1.33) 
7/30/65 85.25 9/29/65 90.02 10/ 5/65 90.63 4.77 (0.61) J.02 {2.42) · 
lo/ 5/65 90.63 11/ 9/65 91.93 11/15/65 92.63 1.30 (0.70) {0.53) (2.55) 
l/15/65 92.63 11/19/65 92.24 11/29/65 91.80 (0.39) o.44 (2.34) (1.40) · 
1/29/65 91.80 12/7/65 91.39 12/13/65 91.83 (0.41) (0.44) · (2.24) {2.27) 
l.2/13/65 91.83 12/27/65 91.52 1/ 4/66 92.26 (0.31) (0.74) {~.15) (2.58) ·. 
1/ 4/66 92.26 2/ 1/66 92.16 2/10/66 93.83 {0.10) (1.67) (1~94) (3.53) 
2/10/66 93.83 2/16/66 93.16 4/ 4/66 90.76 {0.67) 2.40 (2.54) · o.56 
4/ 4/66 90.76 4/28/66 91.13 6/ili/66 87.07 0.37 4.06 (1.45) . 2.28 
6/14/66 87.07 6/28/66 85.67 6/30/66 ----- (1.40) ---- {3.13) . 
TOTALS ~17.57 i 2.89 $.(16.91) f(jl.7o) 
But .. AND-HOLD: 







Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Total 
Buy Long 13/30 14/21 6/20 33/71 
Sell Short 5/27 8/21 3/19 16/67 
The annualized percent of net return on initial investment by test 
as follows: 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
Timing Technigue: 
Buy Long 24.9% 31.2% Negative 
Sell Short Negative Negative Negative 
Combined 7.0% 16.1% Negative 
Buy-and-Hold 135 .6% 53.1% 6.3% 
Sell-and-Hold 17.3% 17.3% N/A 
Combined 78.3% J6.9% N/A 
N. B. N/ A in Test 3 denotes "not applicable. 11 The sellc...and-
hold technique was not used in this test. 
The final statistic derived from the tests is perhaps the most 
important. The timing strategy in order to prove superior to a policy 
of buying or selling and holding should cause sales of long purchases 
to be made at a higher price on each transaction than the price repur-
chased at on the succeeding transaction. By the same token, the strategy 
should cause short sales to be covered at a lower price than the price 
it is sold short at on the subsequent transaction. The number of times 
per total number of transactions the "timing technique 11 proved efficient 
in accomplishing this feat may be summarized as follows: 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Total --
Buy Long 4/30 2/21 3/20 9/71 
Sell Short 1/27 J/21 5/19 9/67 
The latter computations which have made allowance for broker's 
fees yield an over-all percentage of efficiency, for both buy-long and 
39 
sell-short transactions of approximately 13 percent. These ratios 
represent the percentage of the time, considering brokerage costs, that 
it proved advantageous, profitwise, to heed the signals generated by 
the mechanical trading rules. 
Particularly noteworthy with regard to the statistical revelations 
is the fact that the implications of each test were consistent both 
from test to test and for individual stocks within the tests. Inasmuch, 
as these tests encompassed different stocks over differing periods this 
consistency provides an important testimony in behalf of their validity. 
Also notable is the comparative superiority of buy-long over short 
sale applications on the timing technique. Admittedly, this is at least 
partly attributable to the general strength of the market during the 
over-all test period. 
Analysis of the results produced by a policy of buying long only 
yields some interesting implications, however. The timing technique, 
used on this basis only, produced approximately 25 and 31 percent net 
annual returns when applied to stocks consistently stronger than the 
market in the first two tests. Even though the "long purchase only" 
approach was substantially inferior to buy-and-hold in the first two 
tests, such returns would undoubtedly appear attractively sufficient to 
the average investor. On the other hand, when applied to average stocks, 
represented by Standard and Poor's composite index in Test 3, a negative 
net return ensued from use of the buy-long approach. 
Quite clearly, when the latter test is taken into consideration, 
the handsome returns produced by the first two tests can hardly be 
attributed to the efficiency of the trading rules. Rather, the impetus 
for these gains appears to lie in the repeated purchase of stocks 
stronger than the general market during a period of sustained over-all 
upward price movement. 
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Summarization of the statistical implications and conclusions 
derived therefrom appear in the final chapter. The succeeding section 
also makes suggestions for further research in this area, as engendered 
by this and other related sutdies, previously mentioned. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The major problem in this study consisted of a critical appraisal 
of a single method of technical analysis, reputed to provide a timing 
technique for stock market traders. Two major conclusions were indi-
cated by the results of this appraisal. A statement of these conclu-
sions, accompanied by respective summarizations of pertinent findings, 
is as follows: 
(1) Coppock 1s "Timing Technique for Traders" does not produce net 
profits equal to those yielded by a simple buy-and-hold (or sell-and-
hold) policy applied to the same stocks. In none of the tests, nor for 
none of the individual stocks tested, did the mechanical trading rules 
produce net profits equal to those generated by a policy of simply 
buying (or selling) and holding. The validity of the tests was upheld 
by the fact that all three test conclusions were in agreement. The 
twelve stocks used in Tests land 2 seemed to yield the sought after 
implications in a consistent manner. These stocks, admittedly, appeared 
to be extremely advantageous for the buy-and-hold policy; however, this 
in no way invalidates the test implications for it seems to be an accu-
rate description of the "real world" situation with regard to the stock 
market during the periods covered. Leaving the net profit criterion 
aside, the efficiency of the 11timing technique" would have been refuted 
by the fact that in only (approximately) thirteen out of each one-
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hundred transactions did it produce an advantageous trade. 
(2) It appears more profitable to buy stocks that pricewise have 
recently been stronger than the rna:rket as a whole and to sell stocks 
that have recent~y been weaker. Since the stocks contained in Standard 
and Poor's 500-Stock Index comprise approximately 75 percent of the 
total value of all stocks listed on the New York Exchange, it was used 
supplementarily as an indication of the performance of average stocks. 
Based upon this premise, the results of Test 1 and Test 2 were compared 
with those of Test 3, Since both the "timing technique" and the buy-
and-hold approach produced substantially greater net returns in the 
first two tests than they did in the latter, the implications point 
strongly to the above conclusion. Further testing along these lines 
is certainly indicated as this finding is in agreement with the conclu-
sions of Levy mentioned in Chapter III. 
As natural extensions of the above-mentioned major conclusions 
several other implications of the test results seem worthy of mention: 
· The random walk model more accurately describes the movement of 
stock prices than does Coppock 1 s "Timing Technique for Traders." 
· The negative results of Fama's statistical tests with regard to 
use of the proportion of stocks advancing and declining today for pre-
diction of the percentage advancing and declining tomorrow (see Chapter 
III) were upheld by the empirical tests contained herein. 
· Use of the "timing technique" on a buy-long basis only for pur-
chase of relatively strong stocks is apparently superior to a process 
of buying stocks strictly at random. According to the findings of Levy, 26 
261evy, p. 112. 
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the latter approach yielded an annual net return of slightly more than 
10 ! percent during the period October, 1960 to October, 1965, This 
compares unfavorably with yields from the timing technique of 25 and 31 
percent, respectively, for Test 1 and Test 2 of this study. As previ-
ously stressed, however, these high yields seem to result from the 
purchase of stocks consistently stronger than the market, and not from 
the efficiency of the "timing technique." 
In no instance did short sales of weak stocks produce a net 
profit for the mechanical trading rules. This was due, in part, to 
what technicians would designate as a general upward market trend during 
the period tested. Random walk theorists would prefer this phenomenon 
be called "random positive drift." No matter which characterization 
is used, however, any timing strategy must take such a 11trend 11 or 
"drift" into account in order to prove worthwhile. Coppock 1s technique 
apparently does not. 
Concluding Comments 
The way in which stock prices behave and the reasons for their 
behavior pose fascinating questions. If there is more to price behavior 
than the random-walk model admits, a universally acceptable answer has 
not yet been found. Only through direct tests of the various technical 
trading approaches, or further study along the lines initiated by Levy 
will this conflict ever be resolved. 
The strong indication that there may be merit in the long-time 
credo of Wall Street technicians which calls for buying stocks that 
recently have been rising and selling those that have been falling is 
most interesting. Some scholarly sources have suspected for some time 
that these claims do possess merit. The statement by Cootner in this 
respect seems especially appropo: 
Like the Indian folk doctors who discovered 
tranquilizers, the Wall Street witch doctors, 
without the benefit of scientific method, have 
produced something with their magic, even if they 
cannot tell you what it is or how it works.27 
Further study of the timing technique presented herein might most 
fruitfully be directed toward extending the length of time used in the 
weighted average of refined daily advance and decline data from thirty 
days to, perhaps, six months. This should serve to eliminate many of 
the false signals which proved so costly during this study. An apt 
example of such false s~gnals may be most clearly seen by reference 
to Figure 1 for the latter part of 1965, Although it remains to be 
proven, there would appear to be a substantial amount of face validity 
in the choice of market breadth data as truly representative of all 
stocks traded on the exchange. 
The basic purpose of this study as outlined in Chapter I has been 
to provide a critical evaluation of a specific technical trading method. 
It was also proposed that to a limited degree this appraisal would pro-
vide a test of the random character of stock price behavior. 
The results of the study have led to two major conclusions which 
in actuality are somewhat paradoxical. While the first conclusion i:s 
definitely negative with respect to the mechanical efficiency of the 
timing technique, concurrent attestation as to the randomness of stock 
price behavior has not been forthcoming. 
The original contention was that proof or disproof of the timing 
27cootner, p. 26. 
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technique should yield one step toward systematic validation or invalida-
tion of the theory of random walks. Instead, it may only be conclusively 
stated that manipulation of daily advance, decline data in the manner 
prescribed by Coppock does not provide efficient buy and sell timing. 
The portion of the over-all technique which calls for buying stocks 
stronger than the general market has apparent merit. A trader using 
the timing technique as used in this study on a buy-long basis only 
would have reaped rewards substantially greater than those achieved by 
the average investor even though the timing device was completely inef-
ficient. 
The optimal strategy uncovered in this study is a buy-and-hold 
policy applied to stocks consistently stronger than the market. Obvi-
ously, no one stock can be expected to eternally display such strength. 
Some method of continuous upgrading is therefore needed which rids the 
investor's portfolio of stocks which have fallen from favor and adds to 
it other stocks exhibiting recent strength. Some interesting methods 
of such continuous portfolio upgrading have been advanced in the Levy 
study. This is another area which, seemingly, is worthy of extended 
research efforts. 
The findings of this study have in no way been damaged by the 
above-mentioned paradox. On the contrary, this would appear to lend 
to both their strength and credence. It was not desired that the study 
yield an entity providing the beginning and the end of research in this 
specific area. It was entirely successful insofar as it provided a 
basis for judging the worth of Coppock's timing technique which was the 
major aim. Perhaps, as is the case in many research efforts, the major 
success will prove to lie in those areas where implications for future 
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research were generated, rather than in those where concrete conclusions 
were reached . 
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